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FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE.* 3 
VoLs. By Charles Alan Wright. St. Paul, Minn.: West. 1969. $60. 
Review I 
Professor Wright's new three-volume treatise on federal criminal 
practice and procedure is a much needed successor to the one-volume 
work of Professor William W. Barron published in 1951.1 Since 
then, revisions of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, the new 
Federal Appellate Rules, the enormous increase in decisional law, 
and the recent enactment of numerous statutes have made com-
pilation of a comprehensive new treatise mandatory. The far-
reaching developments in federal criminal procedure-particularly 
the requirements for appointment of counsel-mean that many 
lawyers must now educate themselves in the intricacies of the fed-
eral criminal justice system. Even those who may think they are at 
home in that system probably need the refresher course which a 
reading of these three volumes provides. Fortunately, Professor 
Wright has an easy style and he gives the reader something to look 
for by expressing his mvn opinions about matters both settled and 
unsettled. By following the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure 
in numerical order the author has provided a double index system 
and, although many of the more important subjects are not explic-
itly covered in the rules, the scheme does provide a logical place for 
everything. However, since the work covers a rapidly developing 
field of law, and since there are sharp divisions of opinion regarding 
many aspects of criminal procedure, any reader is bound to find 
statements and methods of treatment with which he could take 
issue. 
In his discussion of rule 5, the provision requiring that the ar-
rested person be taken before a magistrate "without unnecessary 
delay," Professor Wright reviews Miranda v. Arizona2 and its young 
progeny which require exclusion of confessions or admissions made 
while in custody, unless a four-part warning has been given and a 
proper waiver of rights has been shmvn. Thus, the application of 
Miranda will frequently turn on whether the defendant was "in 
custody" at the crucial time. The cases cited would be more helpful 
• These three books are the first volumes in a new treatise on the Federal Rules of 
Criminal, Civil, and Appellate Procedure. The civil rules will be covered by Professor 
Wright and Professor Arthur R. Miller of the University of Michigan Law School. The 
appellate rules will be treated by Professor Wright and Eugene Gressman of the District 
of Columbia Bar.-Ed. 
1. 4 W. BARRON, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE (1951). 
2. 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
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if the footnote summaries noted more exactly the surroundings of 
the defendant at the time of the interview by authorities; for exam-
ple, was the defendant in his own office? Also, the courts have ap-
parently been more ready to find the element of compulsion lacking 
when FBI agents have done the interviewing. 
I do not agree with Professor Wright that the Supreme Court 
will necessarily exclude the fruits of every statement found to have 
been taken in violation of Miranda. If the fruit is a kidnapped 
child, a dead body, or stolen bonds, it would seem to be carrying 
logic beyond all good reason to exclude such evidence, even if the 
defendant's admissions could not be received in evidence. In prac-
tice, I think that within the next few years the courts, with the 
help of such studies as the American Law Institute proposals for a 
pre-arraignment code, will find ways to modify the consequences of 
.Miranda and perhaps even to permit some relaxation of its re-
quirements in the discretion of the trial judges. Of course the 
Supreme Court could do this much more effectively by use of its 
rulemaking power than by piecemeal case-by-case adjudication. 
The subject of discovery is rightly given much space. Professor 
Wright points out that the rule 5 provisions for preliminary exam-
ination before the United States Commissioner ("Magistrate" under 
the 1968 Federal Magistrates Act3) were not meant to be the means 
of affording discovery.4 This fact seems clear from the function 
of grand juries in the federal system and from the detailed provi-
sions of rule 16. I agree with the author that increased discovery 
should be by "carefully considered amendment of the rules, rather 
than by a novel construction of the existing rule" (vol. I, pp. 139-
40), meaning rule 5. It is true that in England the preliminary 
hearing is the primary means of discovery,5 especially since the 
Crown must produce substantially all its important evidence at the 
hearing. But even in England this has created problems of prejudi-
cial publicity, and such difficulties would be infinitely harder to 
control here. In addition, the danger of intimidating witnesses and 
the risks attendant upon greater delay in bringing cases to trial 
would make such a requirement unwise in the United States. 
Professor "Wright is accurate in saying that there is a distinct trend 
toward broad discovery. It is clearly in the interest of the prosecu-
tion-as well as of the defense-to inform the defense of the factual 
basis for the prosecution. In many cases this leads to earlier disposi-
tion by way of plea settlements, especially since defense counsel usu-
ally receives more accurate and complete information in this way 
l!. Pub. L. No. 90-578, 82 Stat. 1107 (Oct. 17, 1968) (codified in 18, 28 U.S.C.). 
4. See Weinberg &: 'Weinberg, The Congressional Invitation To Avoid the Prelim-
inary Hearing: An Analysis of Section 303 of the Federal Magistrates Act of 1968, 67 
MICH. L. REv. ll!61, 1390-9!! (1969). 
5. D, KARLEN, ANGLO-A.Ml!RICAN CRn.ilNAL JUSTICE 158-61, 165-66 (1967). 
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than his client is willing or able to give him. Moreover, full disclo-
sure makes for fairer trials and minimizes the possibility of post-con-
viction complaints. The main argument for strictly limited disclo-
sure has been that, since many defense counsel are not to be trusted, 
perjury and intimidation will result from full disclosure. Now that 
many more attorneys are defending criminal cases by assignment, 
however, there should be a steady and noticeable improvement in 
the standards and practices of lawyers representing criminal de-
fendants. If the trial courts are given the power, in appropriate 
cases, to allow discovery only at stated times and on certain condi-
tions, it seems that broader discovery in the great majority of cases 
would be highly desirable. 
With respect to pleas of guilty, Professor Wright points out the 
undesirability of permitting a defendant to plead without counsel. 
In my opinion, recent case law and the enormous increase in the 
number of habeas corpus petitions by state prisoners on this point 
underline the importance of never permitting a defendant to plead 
or stand trial without having an attorney present to advise and assist 
him, regardless of what the defendc\.nt may wish. Moreover, la'wyers 
defending criminal cases must also be prepared to defend their ad-
vice and their performance at some later date in one or more post-
conviction proceedings. Thus, under recent decisions, the case of 
client against lawyer has been built into every criminal proceeding 
in which the result is anything short of acquittal or dismissal. Still, 
the trial court must do what it can to protect its judgments, and the 
least it can do is to require lawyers to attend every case no matter 
how up.pleasant and profitless that task may be. 
In his discussion of waiver of jury trial, Professor Wright notes 
a 1930 Supreme Court case,6 apparently with approval, for the prop-
osition that trial by jury is the preferable mode of disposing of fact 
issues ju ijerio1-1s qiJninal cases. While a footnote cites some figµres 
for 1964 and 1965 indicating waiver of juries in thirty per cent of 
criminal trials (vol. 2, p. 8 n.18), the trend is even more pro-
nounced now. In the Southern Dfatrict of New York, defendants 
presently waive a jury in one half of the criminal cases that are tried. 
Since the Government and the trial judge must also consent to dis-
pensing with a jury, it seems that ideas of what is preferable have 
undergone considerable change. 
Professor Wright questions the constitutionality of the 1966 
amendment to rule 25, which provides that if the judge presiding 
at a jury trial is unable to procee:d, another judge may be assigned 
to finish the trial upon certifying that he has familiarized himself 
·with the record. Professor Wright thinks that unless the defendant 
consents, a mistrial should result. At the same time he does not ques-
6. Patton v. Upia:d States, 281 U.S. 276 (19110). 
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tion. the provision allowing another judge to take OYet after the vet-
dict.1 If another judge can act to impose sentence and pass on all 
motions after verdict, I see no good teason why he cannot substitute 
during the trial. Of course if the circumstances make such substitu-
tion inadvisable, the substituted judge could declare a mistrial, but 
in most cases substitution would be feasible and desirable. 
The admissibility of confessions ahd identification evidence and 
claims of illegal search and seizure, which the Supreme Court dealt 
with in Miranda, Jackson 11. Denno,8 and United States 11. Wade,9 
now take up considerable time of the trial courts irt hearing mo-
tions to suppress. I think practicing lawyers will be somewhat disap-
pointed by the absence of a guide ot form £or the motion papers 
which should be filed before trial wherever possible. Moreover, it 
would be helpful to refer to the provisions of the Omnibus Crime 
Control and Safe Streets Act of 196810 regarding motions to sup-
press. 
Professor Wright points out that in Simmons v. United States,11 
the Court held that the accused does not, by testifying at an evidert-
tiary hearing, subject himself to cross-examination as to other issues 
in the case, and that his testimony is not admissible against him at 
trial on the issue of guilt, although it may be used to impeach him 
if he later testifies inconsistently at the trial.12 Thus, in most cases 
there should be no reason hot to call the defendant in order to 
support a motion to suppress. The Simmons holding has been ht-
corporated in the Preliminary Draft of Rules of Evidence for the 
United States District Courts and Magistrates, circulated i11 March 
1969 by the Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure of the 
Judicial Conference. Undoubtedly Professor Wright's first set of 
supplementary pocket parts will make liberal use of tnany of these 
proposed rules and the supporting commentary. 
It is gratifying to find Professor Wright quoting generously from 
the numerous proposed standards issued by the American Bar As-
sociation on Minimum Standards for Criminal Justice. But I think 
it would have been helpful to include more references to the Pleas 
of Guilty standards which, in paragraph 1.8, state the reasons why 
the sentencing court may give more lenient sentences to those who 
plead guilty. 
Section 350I(a) of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets 
Act of 196813 requires that when a motion is made to suppress a con-
7. FED. R. CIV. P. 25(b). 
8. 378 U.S. 368 (1964). 
9. 388 U.S. 218 (1968). 
10. Pub. L. No. 90-351, 82 Stat. 197 (Julie 19, 1968). See, in particu1ar, title III, 
§ 2518(10)(a) and title VIII, § 1301. 
11. 390 U.S. 377 (1968). 
12. Walder v. United States, 347 U.S. 62 (1954). 
13. 18 U.S.C.A. § 350l(a) (1969). 
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fession on the ground that it was not voluntary, the trial judge, sit-
ting without a jury, shall first determine the issue of voluntariness. 
In discussing this provision, Professor Wright states that the judge 
must find beyond a reasonable doubt that the confession is volun-
tary before he admits it. I find no basis for requiring that the judge 
must make such a finding. The statute does not say this, nor, so far as 
I know, is such a test required for any preliminary ruling on matters 
which are evidentiary. The only authority cited is a decision by the 
United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia,14 but I 
doubt that any other federal circuit would agree with the District 
of Columbia Circuit on the point. 
In commenting on the Supreme Court decisions on electronic 
surveillance, Professor Wright expresses the view that the decisions 
in Katz v. United States15 and Berger v. New York16 seem to limit 
the use of recording devices by informers. I do not agree. Al-
though the Seventh Circuit appears to share Professor Wright's in-
terpretation,17 the Second Circuit recently held that the use of re-
cording devices by informers is not banned by the Supreme Court's 
earlier decisions.18 To my mind, Katz and Berger, which involved 
electronic surveillance performed without the knowledge of any of 
the participants in the intercepted conversations, have no applica-
tion to cases such as White and Kaufer, in which a conversation is 
recorded with the consent of one of the parties and the recording 
merely serves to preserve the consenting party's recollection. In any 
event, this question is likely to be settled soon, since the Supreme 
Court has recently granted certiorari in the White case.19 
Admissions to bail before trial and even after trial have become 
greatly important in the United States because of the longer de-
lays in trying more cases and the inordinate time required to dis-
pose of an increased number of appeals. Not until we are equipped 
to dispose summarily of frivolous appeals and to expedite all other 
appeals by appropriate supervision by the appellate courts them-
selves will we be able to move the appellate traffic with suitable 
speed. The mere promulgation of rules is futile; there must be a 
rule for each case, depending on its peculiar circumstances, imposed 
by the court and enforced by appropriate sanctions. 
With respect to appointment of counsel under the Criminal Jus-
tice Act,20 the author fails to point out that no allowance may be 
14. Clifton v. United States, 371 F.2d 354, 357 n.7, 362, cert. denied, 386 U.S. 995 
(1967). 
15. 389 U.S. 347 (1967). 
16. 388 U.S. 41 (1967). 
17. See United States v. White, 405 F.2d 838 (7th Cir. 1969). 
18. See United States v. Kaufer, 406 F.2d 550 (2d Cir.), afj'd on other grounds, 394 
U.S. 458 (1968) (per curiam). 
19. 394 U.S. 920 (1969). 
20. 18 U.S.C. § 3006A (1964). 
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made under the Act for work done on appeals unless an order of 
appointment of the court of appeals has been made prior to the 
performance of services for which claim is made. Of course the stat-
ute should be amended to allow compensation which at least ap-
proximates the cost of services rendered. As it is, counsel almost 
always are paid far less than the value of their services, and even 
low-cost, well-organized services such as the Legal Aid Society of 
New York lose money on every appeal handled. 
Professor Wright includes one reference which I think would 
have been better omitted. In Volume l, he quotes Dean Pye to sup-
port the view that criminal procedures give overwhelming advan-
tage to the prosecution (p. 498). The Dean attempts to demonstrate 
the illusory nature of any supposed advantages enjoyed by the defen-
dant by citing the percentage of cases in which the Government 
obtains convictions. The evidence does not support this conclusion. 
The high percentage of convictions is produced not by unfair ad-
vantages possessed by prosecutors, but rather by the careful 
screening process which occurs prior to the initiation of a prosecu-
tion. The exercise of discretion by prosecutors, particularly in se-
lecting for prosecution only those cases in which there is better than 
an even chance of conviction, and the requirements of probable 
cause, should and do result in a high percentage of convictions. The 
same factors account for the fact that in about ninety per cent of 
serious criminal cases the defendants choose to plead guilty. If these 
conditions did not exist, the machinery of the courts would be un-
workable and our system of criminal justice would fall far short of 
its purpose. That purpose, which some academic writers seem to lose 
sight of, is to convict the guilty and acquit the innocent by using 
procedures fair to both sides; it is not to give defense lawyers a fifty-
fifty chance to win acquittal for their clients, whether guilty or 
innocent, solely in the interest of making it a more even game. 
There are several ways in which these volumes could be made 
more useful to the practitioner. The timetable, instead of being 
merely an alphabetical index, could list chronologically the steps 
which defense counsel should consider and the time allowed for 
each of these steps. Also in the index, references should be to spe-
cific pages rather than to sections which may run for many pages. 
The pocket parts should state the volumes of the reports covered in 
each annual edition; the current work seems to go through June 
1968 judging from cases and statutes cited, but if the exact volumes 
were given the reader would know just what additional ground to 
cover. These are at best minuscule imperfections in a treatise of 
such monumental proportions in a field where the text is somewhat 
dated the minute it is set in type. There is no scholar who can speak 
with more authority than Professor Wright. In these three volumes 
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his unique experience as a member of the Committee on Rules of 
Ptactice atid Ptocedure of the Judicial Conference and the informed 
scholarship which has already given us his one-volume work on the 
federal courts21 have produced a work which is the single most use-
ful text for anyone concerned with federal criminal justice. 
Review II 
]. Edward Lumbard, 
Chief Judge, 
United States Court of Appeals 
for the Second Circuit 
A childhood hymn recites that while strolling in the garden the 
voice of God disclosed a joy that none other had ever known. Too 
many judges, especially federal appellate judges, seem to feel that 
they also possess a special insight that no one else can possibly share. 
The extent to which this observation is true marks the dimensions of 
the job attempted by Professor Wright. Each month approximately 
nine volumes of the Federal Reporter join the shelves. Among these 
new volumes a great bulk of pages interpret and reinterpret the 
maxims of federal criminal procedure. Often, no reconciliation of 
the views expressed in the many opinions is possible. Some seem not 
to subscribe to the Supreme Court Reporter; others reflect great 
study of the decisions and remarkable ingenuity in evading the plain 
precedent of the highest court's decisions.1 For this reason the prac-
titioner must join the legendary dissatisfied of Dean Pound's famous 
speech.2 lt is not only the laymen who want some predictability in 
law; Ia-wyers as well do not respect intermediate appellate courts 
which disregard the opinions of the highest court. In his three vol-
umes Professor Wright wisely makes no attempt to reconcile the 
irreconcilable-to tie together the ridiculously divergent opinions 
of the various circuits. Instead, he relies principally upon the opin-
ions of the Supreme Court in the areas of controversy. His willing-
ness to do so lends credit and authority to the volumes, and that 
stature, together with Professor Wright's personal renown, will con-
tribute to a more uniform federal procedure. 
21. C. WRIGHT, FEDElW. COURTS (1963). 
I. E.g., U~ited States v. Vita, 294 F.2d 521 (2d Cir. 1961), cert. denied, !l69 U.S. 823 
(I!l62) trefusal to apply McNabb-Mallory Rule and FED. R. CRiM. P. 5(a)]. When too 
many courts refuse to obey, what can the Supreme Court do? 
2. Pound, The Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with the Administration of Justice, 
29 A.B.A. REP. 895 (1906). 
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The volumes do not treat criminal procedure in depth, and 
consequently it is even more significant that the principal issues are 
discerningly presented. For example, amid the confusion of Mi-
randa3 and the various attempts to circumvent its principles, one 
could very easily overlook the crucial fact that the most important 
result of the decision is to change the factual qµestions. While the 
old "totality of the circumstances" test is still 1:elevant, the questions 
now are essentially: (1) Was the suspect given his Miranda warning, 
and if so, (2) Did he thereafter waive his privilege? Other questions 
obviously remain, but the critical facts in most cases will now re-
volve around the issue of "waiver." Professor Wright focµses on this 
change with precision. 
In the same way, the critical nature of discovery is properly em~ 
phasized. This is the area of criminal law that is in greatest need 
of revision. Quite apart from the needless trials which take place 
because the defense is ignorant of the strength of the government's 
case, innocent people have been prejudiced by the lack of discovery. 
For example (ignoring the factual presumption made by many 
judges and jurors that, because of the ''reliable" screening afforded 
by police and public prosecutors, the ai;:cused would not be in court 
if he were not guilty), if an innocent man is accused of having made 
a sale of heroin to an 1.1ndercover agent some five months prior to 
the date of the complaint, he can hardly develop a legitimate alibi 
for a date so far in the past. He must know the precise evidence 
against him if he is to expose the false accusation. Yet most avenues 
of discovery are closed to him, On the other hand, the absence of 
discovery does not significantly hinder the guilty defendant because 
he knows the facts. It is only the innocent who suffer. Until dis-
covery is broadened to minimize such anomalous situations, it cannot 
be asserted that the dark ages of criminal procedure are past. 
Professor Wright wisely avoids some traps for the unwary com-
mentator. The thicket of collateral attacks, for example, and the 
resulting congestion in appellate dockets do not lend themselves 
readily to summary evaluation, for their expansion has grown un-
evenly from a need for reform. Until recently, the evils of trial pro-
cedure were almost impossible to disturb on a collateral attack. Even 
in direct appeals, if the appellant was indigent, the trial judge could 
remove the ground for his appeal simply by certifying that the case 
involved no substantial question. A few years ago, for instance, I 
was appointed counsel for an indigent, and my client's appeal from 
the trial court's decision against him was certified frivolous by a 
distinguished trial judge. A three-judge panel of the Circuit Court 
of Appeals for the District of Columbia agreed, and a petition for 
rehearing en bane on the question of the frivolity of the appeal was 
3. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
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unavailing. The Supreme Court reversed,4 but by the time a panel 
of the Circuit Court finally heard the case, the appellant was only a 
few months from his "good time" release date. That panel reversed 
per curiam without dissent and ordered a judgment of acquittal.5 
When the question involves the prosecutorial suppression of evi-
dence favorable to the accused, the need for a full post-trial hearing 
and evaluation becomes even more important.6 Hence the problems 
posed by the multiplicity of collateral attacks do not lend them-
selves to easy solutions, and Professor Wright does well to avoid an 
extended evaluation of those problems. 
Nevertheless, the books do not deal adequately with the wealth 
of decisional authority; indeed, they could not do so without a ten-
fold expansion of volumes. Their main defects are (1) the use of the 
same format as that in the former volumes7-a format based upon 
the federal rules which do not furnish a logical organization for 
the problems of criminal procedure; and (2) treatment of all 
problems with roughly the same degree of concentration when 
certain areas justify greater depth of research and citation. In short, 
for the criminal practitioner the volumes present a good place to 
start research, but they do not provide the same degree of exhaus-
tive citation that may be found in the companion volumes on civil 
procedure.8 This defect is particularly objectionable in view of the 
broad scope of the work. It would have been more logical either to 
consider only the basic and most important problems in a few 
pages or to treat all the problems in considerable detail. Unfor-
tunately, these volumes do neither. But in light of the massive 
amount of decisional materials and the rapidly changing principles, 
one must concede the virtual impossibility of such an undertaking. 
On the whole, these are books written by an eminent authority, 
and, as such, they are certain to be read and relied upon by both 
lawyers and judges. Fortunately for the administration of criminal 
justice, Professor Wright hits the mark far more frequently than 
he misses. 
George W. Shadoan, 
Member of the Kentucky, 
Maryland, and District of 
Columbia Bars 
4. Kemp v. United States, 369 U.S. 661 (1962) (per curiam). 
5. Kemp v. United States, 311 F.2d 774 (D.C. Cir. 1962). 
6. See, e.g., Powell v. Wiman, 287 F.2d 275 (5th Cir. 1961) (over state objection, the 
subpoena duces tecum was utilized after trial to discover suppressed evidence). 
7. 4 w. BARRON, FEDERAL PRAcrICE AND PROCEDURE (1951, Supp. 1968); 4 C. WRIGHT, 
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, CUMULATIVE SUPPLEMENT (1964). 
8. W. BARRON & A. HoLTZOFF, FEDERAL PRAcrICE AND PROCEDURE (C. Wright ed. 1960, 
Supp. 1968). One volume of a new treatise on the civil rules, 4 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, 
FEDERAL PRAcrICE AND PROCEDURE (1969), which, together with the three volumes on 
the criminal rules, will replace the older treatise, has been published. 
